Crunch Time: Breaking down Texas’ third-down and red-zone performance vs. Oklahoma

   

The Texas Longhorns secured a victory of colossal proportions against the Oklahoma Sooners at the Cotton Bowl on Saturday with a dominant 34-3 win. After starting sloppy, the Longhorns found themselves in a 3-0 hole, the first time this team has trailed all season. They responded with 34 unanswered points.

While Texas ended up with a historic victory, there were numerous areas that failed to look sharp, particularly on the offensive side of the ball. In this rendition of Crunch Time, we’ll take a look at how Texas performed on third downs and in the red zone.

Third down

5-of-13 (38.5 percent)

Photo by Alex Slitz/Getty Images

Texas turned in one of their worst performances on third down thus far this season. Converting 38 percent of third downs is the second lowest on the season, only besting the showing against UTSA when the Longhorns converted 30 percent of their third downs.

Against Oklahoma, falling behind on first and second down routinely put Texas into precarious third-down situations, namely obvious passing scenarios thanks to third and longs. Texas faced an average down and distance of 7.1 yards because nine of the 13 third downs were five yards or more.

Routinely facing these scenarios will limit any offense, even one as talented and versatile as Texas. Perhaps the greatest hindrance this creates is the limitation on head coach Steve Sarkisian’s play-calling range. Sarkisian thrives on confusing a defense with as many possible outcomes on any given play. Unfortunately for Texas, he’s essentially forced into passing-only play calls when facing third and distance.

This trend is etched into Texas’ third-down play calls and outcomes. The Longhorns threw the ball on 12-of-13 third downs with quarterback Quinn Ewers going 7-of-12 passing for 109 yards. Every third-down conversion was a pass — Texas did not convert a single third down on the ground. This is generally not a recipe for success.

Evaluating the third down performance and seeing these trends while knowing the Longhorns won by 31 is perplexing. It is absurd that Texas can win by such a large margin while failing to rush for a third down and throwing on 12-of-13 third downs.

Unsurprisingly, Texas’ strongest offense quarter, the second, was the quarter with the most third-down conversions and the best efficiency-wise. The first drive of the quarter ended in the go-ahead touchdown for Texas and featured two third-down conversions.

After a scoreless quarter, tight end Gunnar Helm and wide receiver DeAndre Moore Jr. both stepped up on third down to provide a struggling Ewers with security.

Moore and Ewers connected on a spectacular throw and catch to gain 26 yards on 3rd and 5. On the play, Ewers opted to roll out of the pocket after not seeing his initial reads open. While on the run, he lofted the ball towards the sideline where a streaking Moore made a highlight-reel catch. Moore was able to secure the ball over his head while getting a foot inbounds.

The second conversion of the drive was a play call from Sarkisian that the team has practiced throughout the week to neutralize the aggressiveness of the Oklahoma linebackers and defensive line. He dialed it up with the Longhorns were facing a 3rd and 6 from the Oklahoma 7-yard line.

With the ball on the left hash, Helm lined up off left tackle Kelvin Banks while three wide receivers were split out to the far side of the field and running back Quintrevion Wisner offset to Ewers’ right. On the snap, Ewers immediately broke into a sprint out to the right, away from Helm. The wideouts ran a frequently used red zone trips route combo, the slant rub for the inside wide receiver while the line rolled right. Once he got to the middle of the field, Ewers pivoted and lofted a pass above the Oklahoma defender in pursuit. Helm secured the catch and was able to accelerate into the end zone for six.

On this play, Sarkisian bet on Oklahoma blitzing or simply being overly aggressive, two things they have routinely done on film. Nonetheless, this play demonstrates the trust he has in both Ewers and Helm. Ewers is expected to sprint to the right and throw the ball right while pivoting his body back around to left. He doesn’t have time to check if the pivot is going to get him hit by a backside defender or if Helm is covered. For Helm, Sark is trusting him in multiple areas such as selling the block, securing the catch, and manuevering for the first down. The trust paid off, big time.

While this play represents the capabilities of the Texas offense, it was not the norm on Saturday. Texas routinely looked out of sync. Ewers misfired a few times and was forced to throw the ball into less than optimal windows on a few other occasions. Additionally, he had to check the ball down more frequently than Texas would like, especially on third down.

For Texas to improve next week, winning first and second down is critical. The Longhorns will need to create third and manageable such that Sarkisian can force the defense to defend both the run and pass.

Despite the struggles against Oklahoma, the Longhorns remain strong on the season on third down. Currently, Texas ranks 13th in the country with a 50.0-percent conversion rate.

Red zone

Six total attempts, two TDs, two made FGs, one missed FG, one turnover on downs

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Texas indisputably had their worst red-zone performance of the season. Not only did Texas fail to convert opportunities into touchdowns but the Longhorns were inside the Oklahoma 20-yard line on two occasions and failed to score at all.

Beginning with touchdowns, Texas scored from the OU 6-yard line, which occurred on the previously mentioned screen to Helm, and the OU 1-yard line.

After a successful trick play brought the ball to the OU 2-yard line, Sarkisian brought freshman Jerrick Gibson into the game and used a heavier package with both Helm and H back Juan Davis in the game and lined up on the same side. In addition, Sarkisian aligned wide receiver Silas Bolden off the hip of Davis, creating three additional blockers on the right side of the offensive line. Sarkisian called a run up the middle, which Gibson bounced thanks to a hole that happened behind the trio. The hole closed quickly and gained one.

Now facing 2nd and goal from the OU 1-yard line, Texas opted to spread the defense out with three wide receivers split out wide and Helm lined up behind Banks. Despite the difference in size and blockers in the box from the 12-personnel formation on first down to this formation, Sarkisian opted to use his skill players as lead blockers. Moore, who was lined up in the slot left, jet motioned to serve as the lead blocker while Helm pulled from behind Banks to serve as an additional blocker behind Moore. In the backfield, Ewers and Gibson ran a read option which Ewers correctly pulled. Helm and Moore both got enough of their blocks to free Ewers and he scored.

Sarkisian’s approach in this two-play sequence highlights his adaptability and creativity in high-pressure situations. He attacked the Oklahoma defense in two very different personnel groups and formations after the first was unsuccessful. He also once again used motion to his advantage. The ability for Texas to bring power into spread formations could be crucial down the stretch.

Unfortunately, not everything showcased creativity, power, and execution in the red zone. In fact, most of it did not. To start, two drives were derailed thanks to penalties.

With the score 21-3, the defense forced another fumble that set the offense up with a short field. Texas moved down the field thanks to the running of Jaydon Blue and was facing a 4th and 1 from the OU 16-yard line. Blue took the pitch from Ewers and scampered around the edge for a first down, but Helm was called for a holding penalty, so Texas sent the field goal team onto the field. Kicker Bert Auburn would missed, so the score remained 21-3.

With the third quarter running down and the score still 21-3, Texas was driving. Facing 2nd and 12 on the OU 18-yard, Blue once again scampered for a nice gain, this time 10 yards to set up a 3rd and 2, but right guard DJ Campbell was called for holding, all but ending the drive. This time, Auburn made the field goal.

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In both scenarios, Texas left points on the board due to penalties. One reason why Texas has been so successful this season has been the lack of penalties. Texas still leads the SEC is lowest number of penalties and penalty yards. Texas must continue this while ensuring the penalties called don’t occur on third downs or in the red zone.

The remaining two red-zone drives ended in a made field goal and a turnover on downs. Both had sloppy execution. On the field goal drive, Texas gained a first down to the 10 before failing to move the ball on a Wisner run, end zone throw to Golden, and screen to Wisner.

On the run, the line failed to identify an Oklahoma safety creeping into the box, and he came downhill to disrupt the play. Instead of splitting up, Majors and Connor attempted to double team an OU linebacker.

On the throw to Golden, it’s slightly unclear what type of ball Ewers was trying to throw making it difficult to discern whether the incompletion was an errant throw, poor timing, or a miscommunication between him and Golden.

On the play, Golden did create a window of separation similar to the route against Michigan where a 1 ball low and near the pylon would have resulted in a score. Instead, the ball delivered was high and outside. Golden never had a chance to get a foot inbounds. In addition, the ball seemed late. Instead of snapping his head and coming out of his break with the ball on him, Golden a yard or two out of this moment when the ball arrived.

On a throw of this nature, it is very easy to blame the failed connection on Ewers. The ball appears high and late. However, a route whose foundation is built on timing is more complex than simply what appears on TV. Ewers or any other quarterback throwing a timing route is throwing to a certain spot at a certain time. It’s possible the route by Golden was accelerated just enough to disrupt the connection.

Whether it was a poor throw by Ewers, bad timing, or some combination, it doesn’t change the fact that the miscue led to a failed red zone possession. After two unsuccessful plays, Sarkisian opted for a screen to Wisner which Oklahoma blew up. Auburn would nail the kick.

The final failed red-zone possession was a turnover on downs. After a failed play action on first down, the Texas offensive line opened a nice cutback lane for Blue, which he utilized to gain eighj yards. Texas now faced 3rd and 2 from the OU 10-yard line.

Ewers opted to throw a flat route to Moore, which sailed wide. The Oklahoma defender rushing was positioned between Ewers and Moore . This disruption and the potential of a batted ball seem to influence Ewers as he overcorrected to ensure the throw cleared the defender.

The play call from Sarkisian not only opened up Moore, but Golden who ran a snag route to the same side of the field. Ewers immediately got the ball, which gave him no time to look at Golden. The hurried throw also created a poor mechanizal throw. Ewers throw the ball side armed and flat footed almost simiiar to a second baseman throwing the ball to second base on a double play. While he’s demonstrated the arm talent to make these throws, good mechanics lead to good throws even when there is a short window to get the ball out.

Now facing a 4th and 2 with the ball on the right hash, the Longhorns opted to run an RPO out of 12 personnel with Golden bunched off Helm and Davis who lined up off right tackle Cam Williams. This is a very similar formation to the1st and goal scenario where Gibson took the hand off up the middle.

Kevin Jairaj-Imagn Images

Stacking this formation to the boundary side of the field comes with pros and cons. With so many players in such close proximity, the blocking angles and distance become shorter for Texas, it becomes difficult for a defense to correctly line up in coverage, and there are ways to disguise your play.

However, it also gives you limited space to work with and becomes much easier to defend the run. In this case, Oklahoma had seven guys in the box and all 11 defenders within seven yards of the ball. Each defender was also within half the field. All this is to say: it was crowded in a very small area of the field.

The play call was an RPO with just two routes. Ewers pulled the ball but stayed in the mesh for an extended period of time. It’s possible that Blue could have secured the first given the Oklahoma defender’s position and the short yardage needed. The defender’s weight was coming up the field. He was trying to get back into position to guard against the handoff but it’s unlikely he would have been able had the ball been given immediately.

Nonetheless, Ewers pulled the ball and looked a wide receiver. Unfortunately, there weren’t many options and even less open options. Golden had been knocked off his route leaving Wingo as the only other choice. Wingo did manage to get behind the OU defense, even in a short field, but the pressure in Ewers’ face created an errant throw. The ball should have been on the other wide of Wingo, not the outside, and he had never had a chance.

Parsing through the successes and failures of this drive demonstrate the complex nature of a red-zone series. Sarkisian’s play calling can both open opportunities and limit success. Regardless of the call, the importance of clean execution under pressure serves as a reminder that even well-designed plays can falter without proper mechanics and decision-making. Going forward, Texas will need to refine their red zone execution to convert these critical moments into points.

For the season, Texas has scored touchdowns on 26-of-33 (78.8 percent) red-zone possessions while scoring overall on 29-of-33 (87.9 percent) red-zone possessions.