Putin’s War, Week 117. Jake Sullivan Under Fire, ATACMS Everywhere, and the Stalemate Continues

  

Friday is the 820th day of Putin’s three-day Anschluss with Ukraine. 

This last week has been dominated by a handful of themes.

The most important theme is the restrictions placed upon Ukraine’s ability to use American-made weapons to engage Russian military targets on Russian territory. One of the reasons the Russian invasion of Kharkiv Oblast was able to take place was that even though the Ukrainians could see what was developing, they were forbidden to attack Russian troop concentrations until they crossed into Ukraine.

BACKGROUND: Biden White House Establishes Sanctuaries for Russian Forces Attacking Ukraine; Does This Sound Familiar?

This is not a singular position held by the US. The Germans have refused to supply the Taurus stealth cruise missile for fear that it might be used to attack targets in Russia. As an aside, what makes this whole situation so bizarre is that Crimea was annexed by Russia a decade ago. In the last two years, Russia has formally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. US weapons are freely used in those parts of Russian territory.

BACKGROUND:

Russia’s Friends and Allies Join NATO in Rejecting Russia’s Imminent Annexation of Four Ukrainian Provinces.

Putin’s Illegal Annexation of Ukrainian Territory Marks the Beginning of a War Without a Perceivable End – RedState

This is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky explaining the problem with the restrictions.

The policy would make sense if the Russians agreed to only hit military targets in the combat zone. But the Russians strike Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure and launch those attacks from inside Russian territory. The best you can get from this policy is Jake Sullivan playing five-dimensional tiddlywinks with his escalation obsession.

Ukraine has dispatched a diplomatic team to the US to try to un-f*** this mess. That delegation is getting a positive reception in many circles.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has also asked the US to remove restrictions on the use of US weapons in Russia.

Russia is well aware of the stranglehold Sullivan has on collective European policy toward Ukraine and is fighting hard to keep the US restrictions in place. Earlier in the month, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron gave Ukraine the green light to use British weapons against Russian targets no matter their location. Russia reacted as Russia does, with red-faced shouting.

Russia is also accusing France of allowing Ukraine to use French weapons on Russian territory.

A diplomatic kerfuffle is brewing between the US and UK over Chinese involvement in the war on Russia’s behalf. On Wednesday, UK Defense Minister Grant Shapps accused China of “supplying or planning to supply” lethal aid to Russia. Shapps didn’t offer details, but when the UK’s Defense Minister makes a public statement like this, sane people give him the benefit of the doubt.

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan immediately contradicted him.

Shapps’s statement is not shocking. We know the Russian arms industry depends on China for electronic components and machine tools. We also know that a Chinese drone manufacturer is reselling Starlink internet terminals to the Russian military.

BACKGROUND: Putin’s War, Week 105. Sweden Prepares to Be Heard 

The bigger problem is the Biden Crime Family’s close ties to the Chinese government, and because of those ties, Joe Biden is afraid of pushing the Chinese too hard. Calling them out for providing lethal aid to Russia could very well be a red line in Beijing’s relationship with Joe, Jim, and Hunter.

The third major theme in the last week was the ongoing purge of the Defense Ministry.

BACKGROUND: The Purge of Russia’s Defense Ministry Spreads

No one is quite sure what is going on there or its impact on the war.

The last big subject was the EU finally deciding to use the profits earned by Russian sovereign assets frozen in Europe to help underwrite Ukrainian defense and reconstruction. With the EU on board, all eyes are now on the G7 summit in June, as well as the UK and the US. 

BACKGROUND: EU Will Use Frozen Russian Assets to Fund Ukraine’s Defense and Russia Retaliates

Here are some of my past updates.

Putin’s War, Week 115. ATACMS Makes a Splash and Russia Opens a New Front

For all my Ukraine War coverage, click here.

Politico-Strategic Level

New Drawdown Package

Since the Ukraine foreign aid bill passed, there seems to have been a smoother flow of military aid packages. This is almost certainly due to Jake Sullivan’s loss of power and the Pentagon bureaucracy’s consolidation of control over the program.

Russians Air Tucker Carlson on State Television

The Russians have launched a Tucker Carlson television show. Carlson’s staff insists that Carlson has nothing to do with the show; it is just his old episodes with Russian subtitles. I’m using Glenn Greenwald to give Tucker’s side of the story the best possible spin.

All of that may be true, but when the Russian Foreign Ministry uses your program to underscore the Kremlin’s talking points, it should be a matter of concern.

Russia Facing a Manpower Shortage

The pro-Russia crowd on social media is forever predicting that Ukraine will run out of manpower, and that will bring the war to an end. The actual picture is somewhat different than that. Ukraine will add about 400,000 men to its armed forces this year. Its target was 450,000, but that number is out of reach because of the difficulty of passing a new conscription law. Russia is suffering from a manpower shortage at least as severe as anything facing Ukraine. 

Russia’s problem is more than merely numbers; it’s where the numbers need to go. With the West producing arms and ammunition for Ukraine, Ukraine doesn’t need a major arms industry for the war or as a source of foreign exchange. Ukraine also doesn’t have military commitments on three continents, a navy, a large air force, or a strategic nuclear force.

The terrorist attack on a Moscow concert hall by ISIS sympathizers led to the deportation or flight of a huge number of Central Asian workers. This has created more pressure on Russian industry by reducing the labor supply as demand ramps up to support the war in Ukraine.

RELATED: US Embassy Warned Russia of Terrorist Attack and Putin Ignored It

It isn’t just industry competing with the military for bodies; the security forces are also understrength.

The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs lacks 152,000 employees, said the head of the department, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, in the Federation Council. “We cannot print money and increase salaries, which is the main motive for attracting people to serve in the internal affairs bodies. The situation has not only changed, it has worsened,” he said

You can read more about the security force problem on BBC.

Yes, Russia has more people. It also has many more requirements for them than Ukraine. There’s no such thing as a free lunch.

These People Will Say Anything

One thing Russian officials and Democrat politicians have in common is that they will say whatever they are told to say, no matter how counterfactual or even grotesque it sounds. Here is Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya yammering about how the war in Ukraine would be over by now if it hadn’t been for those “meddling kids.”

Of course, the war would have ended earlier without Western military aid, but that is not a case for allowing Russia to conquer its neighbors. There is zero evidence of Ukrainians, other than those affiliated with the quisling “People’s Republics,” fleeing to Russia. Despite Nebenzya waxing poetic about the “brotherly nations” of Russia and Ukraine, all polling shows that at least 90% of Ukrainians want nothing to do with Russia.

Operational Level

Over the last week, Ukraine has stepped up its use of drones and ATACMS against Russian rear areas while the Russian Army tries to regain some of the momentum it lost. Overall, the front lines remain basically unchanged. 

I think it is fair to say the Russian Winter Offensive effort has reached its culmination point. The question is whether things go to stalemate or if either side can regain the offensive.

Combat Operations

Major Ukrainian Drone Attack

On May 17, Ukraine directed over 50 drones at the Kushchevskaya airfield in Krasnodar Krai, Russia,

Also hit was the oil refinery at Tuapse and Russian military facilities at Novorossiysk.

Armored Attack in Avdiivka Area

This is a platoon-sized armor attack on Ukrainian positions in the former Avdiivka Salient. What is interesting is that artillery ammunition is much more plentiful than it has been for months.

Armored Attack at Chasiv Yar

After laying off for a week, the Russians launched a company-sized attack on Chasiv Yar. It was turned back by artillery and FPV strikes.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

One-on-Two

Here, a single Russian soldier attempts to take out a two-man Ukrainian fighting position. It works about as well as you’d imagine. For me, the takeaway is not that one-on-two fighting rarely works, but look at the emptiness of the battlefield. There are three soldiers in what appears to be about 100 meters of frontage.

How Not To Use a Grenade

This is the type of thing that drives me bonkers. A Ukrainian soldier lobs a grenade into a Russian bunker. The Russian tries to toss it back but grabs a stick by mistake. Five long seconds elapse between arming the grenade and the explosion. One of the basic principles of using grenades is that you cook them off for two or three seconds before throwing them to prevent them from being tossed back at you. Also, if possible, you whip the grenade like you were Catfish Hunter.

What Goes Up, Must Come Down

The Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk came under persistent drone attacks last week. Here you see Russian antiaircraft guns successfully engaging one of them.

Great, right? Just keep in mind all those tracers (and there are four bullets that aren’t tracers for each tracer) have to hit the ground eventually. In the video, they are heading for what looks like apartment blocks across the harbor. This is what your car looks like if it is parked over there.

More Starlink

The more we hear, the harder it is to consider Elon Musk’s Starlink as much other than a questionable asset in this war. Starlink terminals used by the Russian Army can operate inside of Ukraine, but Ukrainian Starlink terminals can’t operate in Crimea. And there is this item from the Russian advance into Kharkiv two weeks ago. 

The Russians have tried to jam Starlink for two years without success, but they succeeded for a few hours in a single area just as Russian troops were crossing the border.

Northern Front

Kharkiv

Lyptsi-Vovchansk

Combat continues on the new front, where the Russians opened up a couple of weeks ago, but the lines have stabilized. There doesn’t appear to be any danger of a Russian penetration of Ukrainian defenses.

Video is starting to appear of civilian massacres in the towns overrun by the Russian Army during its newest offensive. 

When the Russians overran Vovchansk, they expropriated the hospital as a barracks/headquarters. Here, it is getting demolished by Ukrainian JDAMs.

Kreminna-Stepove

This area of the front is stable. Both sides have made successful local attacks, but nothing that threatens the equilibrium.

Donbas

Bahkmut-Klishchiivka-Andriivka

Fighting in this area has shifted away from the previous objective of Chasiv Yar to the area south of Bakhmut. There have been claims that the town of Klishchiivka has fallen, but geolocations and artillery fire indicate the Ukrainian Army still holds it but is under pressure.

Avdiivka

Russia continues to make small advances on this axis. The overall status of the front line is stable and the Russians have not been able to capitalize on the incompetently executed relief in place at Ocheretyne.

BACKGROUND: Putin’s War, Week 113. US Aid Arrives Just in Time and a Russian Attack Nearly Turns Into a Breakthrough

S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile Site, Mospyne, Donetsk

Ukraine used ATACMS missiles to destroy an S-400 SAM site some 30 miles behind the lines in Donetsk. The attack destroyed two S-400 launchers, damaged a third, and demolished the fire control radar and command and control center. This video is unusual because a Ukrainian drone was on station as the ATACMS hit. At 0:03, the site begins engaging the incoming ATACMS. At 0:23, the first ATACMS arrives, creating the unmistakable signature of DPICM. At 0:27, the first launcher explodes.

This is not a great marketing video for the already struggling Russian arms export industry.

Luhansk Internal Affairs Academy

SCALP-EG missiles hit the “Internal Affairs Academy” in occupied Luhansk. At least a dozen military personnel were reported killed.

Southern Front

Zaporizhzhia

Robotyne-Verbove- Novoprokopivka

The line here is stable with some positional changes. The Ukrainian Army seems to have regained possession of Robotyne. The Russians have retaken some trenches near Verbove that they lost during the Summer/Fall Offensive of 2023.

Kherson

Krynky

There are a lot of claims and counterclaims about the fighting in this area. I think the best evidence indicates the front lines remain stable.

Rear Areas

Crimea

Sevastopol

Various Targets in Crimea

Russia

Armavir Early Warning Radar Site

Ukrainian drones struck the Voronezh-DM ballistic missile early warning radar near Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. This radar is part of Russia’s system to detect incoming ICBMs. The damage to the antennae indicates the site is no longer operational. 

Of course, this has caused a case of the squirts in the foreign policy SmartSet™ because it shows how insanely easy it is to open a gaping hole in Russia’s missile attack warning system. This is the kind of response the attack drew from ReallySmartPeople™.

If you’re trying to persuade allies to let you use long-range strike weapons on Russian territory, a live subject at the moment, then why on earth would you hit an early-warning radar that has little obvious battlefield utility but does affect Russia’s nuclear deterrent?

I can think of a lot of reasons off the top of my head. It is a signal to Russia that they can’t continue hitting Ukrainian population centers without paying some sort of price. It humiliates the Russian military. It forces the Russians to provide air defense coverage for the radar sites, and that resource must be pulled from the theater of operations in Ukraine. It makes Jake Sullivan and his fellow travelers befoul themselves. It serves as an excellent bargaining chip to change US and German policy on weapons use. 

We have to stop making a sexual fetish out of concerns about Russia’s feelings.

Belgorod Fuel Depot

What’s Next

From my viewpoint, things haven’t changed much in the last month. The Russian offensive along the Donbas front has run its course without significant gain. The Russian expedition from Belgorod has stalled and, at this point, has to be deemed a failure as it neither penetrated Ukrainian defenses nor established a cordon sanitaire along the border. It also didn’t draw off enough Ukrainian reserves to create an operational opening elsewhere on the front.

The arrival of ATACMS has placed dozens of Russian installations that were previously safe at risk. Just as ATACMS drove Russian attack helicopters from the battlefield, there is a good chance that it will force Russia to reposition fixed-wing aircraft out of range. Ukrainian drones are striking at Russian installations deep inside Russia, and Russia seems powerless to resist.

I don’t think Jake Sullivan’s policy of forbidding the use of US weapons against targets in Russia is sustainable, particularly in an election year and given the pressure by the UK, France, and NATO to change the policy. When that policy changes, it is a whole new ballgame, opening up targets in Belgorod Oblast to ATACMS and JDAM, as well as allowing Ukraine to push air defense systems farther forward.

As I mentioned earlier in the post, the failure of the Russian Winter Offensive moves the front to a stalemate leaving the question of which side can grab the initiative. The loss of men and equipment by Russia over the winter was little short of astounding, and I don’t see how the Russian Army can put together a coherent offensive for several months. I believe Ukraine will move to regain the initiative in late June or early July, but not on the scale of last summer. I think it has to show it can win on the ground somewhere this year for political, if not for military reasons.