Senate Report on Secret Service July 13 Failures Shows That the Keystone Cops Would’ve Done a Better Job

  

The Senate’s preliminary report of its investigation into the U.S. Secret Service’s failures related to the July 13 attempted assassination of Donald Trump is out, and in reading through the stunning details it’s difficult to believe that the failures are solely due to incompetence. The agency’s abdication of its responsibilities was so complete that it’s surprising that more people weren’t killed.

So, what happened? Essentially, in the lead-up to the rally there was one-way communication, going from local law enforcement to the Secret Service and not the other way around, and on the day of the rally a complete siloing of all efforts and communication; there was no clear chain of command for the Secret Service team; and there were multiple technical equipment failures.

RELATED: RedState’s Coverage of the July 13 Assassination Attempt

It’s difficult to pinpoint the most jaw-dropping revelation, but what happened with the Secret Service’s C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System) is a strong contender and a solid illustration of the Keystone Cops nature of the Secret Service operation. The USSS assigned one C-UAS to the rally, and that operator requested additional C-UAS equipment and personnel multiple times in the days before the rally but was denied. Trump’s Secret Service detail asked the USSS advance team for a Counter Surveillance Unit, and the advance team made that request of their superiors, but the request was denied.

So, on July 13 there was one agent, with only three months’ experience with the C-UAS drone, on the ground. The C-UAS system was inoperable until 4:33 PM, which was after the attempted assassin flew his drone. When he couldn’t get the C-UAS to work, what was the agent forced to do?

With no backup system, the USSS agent responsible for overseeing the C-UAS capabilities at the July 13 rally called a toll-free 888 tech support hotline “to start troubleshooting with the company,” which took several hours.

Several hours. Hours that could have been much better used. In this instance, I don’t blame the agent; I blame agency leadership for not ensuring that agents are thoroughly trained and competent in using technology before deploying them – alone – to protect someone like Donald Trump.

Due to the complete siloing of operations on the ground and pre-rally communications, local law enforcement had no idea that this C-UAS was supposed to be used or that it wasn’t operable for many hours. The Secret Service didn’t share its operational plan with the locals, and didn’t request a copy of the locals’ plans. There were two separate comms centers at the rally, and the “primary means of communication between the posts was by cell phone.” The Secret Service and local law enforcement were on different radio channels, and the local law enforcement channels were recorded that day but Secret Service’s was not. One USSS counter sniper said he was offered a local radio that day, but didn’t have time to pick it up because he was too busy fixing a USSS radio that wasn’t working correctly.

As it turns out, though, the only reason counter snipers were even on site that day was because of “credible intelligence of a threat” against Trump – but that threat wasn’t from Thomas Crooks. 

The July 13 rally was the first time a USSS counter sniper team was assigned to a protectee other than the President, Vice President, or a presidential candidate who had been formally nominated by his or her party.

The rally occurred the day before the Republican National Convention was scheduled to convene in Milwaukee, so, in other words, this just happened to be the last opportunity for a sniper to take out Trump without having to contend with counter snipers. Or it should have been. Would Crooks have known this, and would he have known that the plans changed? If he did know, it’s possible he wouldn’t have known that plans changed:

According to the USSS Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, a decision to assign counter snipers to former President Trump’s events occurred sometime in the first week of July. Of the USSS personnel interviewed by the Committee, nearly all – including the Intelligence Advance Agent and the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh Field Office – said they were unaware of any credible intelligence of a threat.

Perhaps if those agents knew there was credible intelligence of a threat, agents on the ground might have acted a little more aggressively in protecting Trump.

Even though USSS agents were aware of an individual around the AGR building with a rangefinder 27 minutes before the shooting, were notified of an individual on the AGR roof two minutes before the shooting, and a counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with guns drawn shortly before shots were fired, why wasn’t Trump taken off the stage? 

The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn “elevated” the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage “did not cross [his ]mind.”

Why not? It would have taken seconds to radio that to the rest of the team.

At the core, this problem highlights a massive problem with USSS leadership and its decision-making process. They apparently can’t make decisions or take charge:

USSS Advance Agents told the Committee that planning and security decisions were collaborative and could not agree on who at USSS was responsible for final approval or decisions.

As listed in the report, here are the key failures identified by the committee:

1. USSS failed to clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13 rally.

• USSS personnel responsible for planning in advance of the July 13 rally denied that they were individually responsible for planning or security failures and deflected blame.
• USSS Advance Agents told the Committee that planning and security decisions were made jointly, with no specific individual responsible for approval.

2. USSS failed to ensure the AGR Building was effectively covered.

• USSS identified the AGR building as a concern due to the line-of-sight from the roof to the stage, but did not take steps to ensure sufficient security measures were in place.
• USSS knew that local snipers planned to set up inside the AGR building and USSS did not express objections or concerns about that placement.
• USSS personnel, including the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, did not enter the AGR building or go on the roof prior to the shooting.
• One USSS Counter Sniper team, whose responsibility included scanning the area around the AGR building for threats, had an obstructed view of the AGR roof.

3. USSS failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement.

• USSS did not give state or local partners specific instructions for covering the AGR building, including the positioning of local snipers.
• USSS did not adequately consider state and local law enforcement operational plans.
• Communications at the July 13 rally were siloed and USSS did not ensure it could share information with local law enforcement partners in real time.

4. USSS failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have enhanced security.

• USSS denied specific requests for additional Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capabilities and a Counter Assault Team liaison.
• A USSS Counter Surveillance Unit – which could have helped patrol the outer perimeter that included the AGR building – was not requested by USSS Advance Agents.
• USSS failed to communicate information about the suspicious person to key personnel, and failed to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump.
• At approximately 5:45 pm, USSS personnel were notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at least eight USSS personnel had been informed.
• Approximately two minutes before shots were fired, the USSS Security Room, located on the rally grounds, was told that there was an individual on the roof of the AGR building.
• Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS Counter Sniper observed local officers running towards the AGR building with guns drawn.

It’s difficult to find words that properly describe just what an epic all-around failure the Secret Service’s operation in Butler was. If they wanted Trump to be assassinated, would they have done anything differently? It seems that without the eagle-eyed local residents and local law enforcement officers who took their job of protection seriously, Crooks would have had enough time to get a solid shot at Trump – and this country would be in utter chaos or worse.

Just this morning President Biden was on The View saying that Donald Trump “does not believe in democracy” and making a motion like he’s squashing a bug after Whoopi Goldberg compared Trump to an insect, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo was on MSNBC calling for Trump to be “extinguished for good.” Hearing those words and reading the Senate’s report, it’s tough to believe that the Biden administration didn’t want this assassination attempt to happen and that they didn’t want it to succeed.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Without independent journalists digging into the Secret Service’s failures on July 13 and since, and without conservative media outlets holding Congress’ feet to the fire, we might not have reports like the one the Senate released Wednesday morning. The Biden/Harris administration would love nothing more than to silence us, either legislatively or by bankrupting us through Big Tech censorship. The only way we can survive their ongoing attacks and fight back is through the direct financial support of our VIP members. If you’re not already a RedState VIP member, please join today – and use discount code FIGHT for 60% off.