As indicated in my prior installment of this series, the Supreme Court is well underway in terms of issuing its decisions for the 2023 Term, having already handed down (as of Wednesday) 18 Opinions. I’m playing a bit of catch-up with these first few installments. Let’s move on to March, in which there were six decisions issued.
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Unlike the first crop, this one does feature some split decisions. Even those aren’t strictly along party lines, however. Just something I like to note.
Again, this is by no means intended as a thorough analysis — just a quick overview for the non-law-geek sorts:
March 2024 Decisions
Date: March 4, 2024
Author: Per Curiam
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Colorado Supreme Court
Basic Facts:
Six Colorado voters (respondents here) fled a petition in Colorado state court against former President Donald J. Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold, contending that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election, from becoming President again.
Issue: Whether Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to a former president alleged to have incited an insurrection at the Capitol.
Holding: Reversed.
Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Trump excluded from Colorado’s 2024 Presidential primary ballot.
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Date: March 15, 2024
Author: Kagan
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Gorsuch, Sotomayor, Jackson
Appeal From: Eighth Circuit
Basic Facts:
After pleading guilty to distributing at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, petitioner Mark Pulsifer faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. At sentencing, he sought to take advantage of the “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law, which allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria. Among those is the requirement, set out in Paragraph (f)(1), that the sentencing court find that—
(1) the defendant does not have—
(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.
The Government argued that Pulsifer could not satisfy that requirement because he had two prior three-point offenses totaling six criminal history points. In the Government’s view, each of those prior offenses disqualified him under Subparagraph B and the six total points disqualified him under Subparagraph A. But Pulsifer claimed he remained eligible. He pointed out that his criminal record lacked a two point violent offense, as specified in Subparagraph C. And in his view, only the combination of the items listed in the subparagraphs could prevent him from getting safety-valve relief. The District Court agreed with the Government, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
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Issue: Whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the “and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).
Holding: Affirmed.
A defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible forsafety-valve relief under 18 U. S. C. §3553(f)(1) only if he satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions—or said more specifically, only if hedoes not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have aprior three-point offense, and does not have a prior two-point violent offense.
Date: March 15, 2024
Author: Barrett
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Sixth Circuit
Basic Facts:
James Freed, like countless other Americans, created a private Facebook profle sometime before 2008. He eventually converted his profle to a public “page,” meaning that anyone could see and comment on his posts. In 2014, Freed updated his Facebook page to refect that he was appointed city manager of Port Huron, Michigan, describing himself as “Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed continued to operate his Facebook page himself and continued to post prolifically (and primarily) about his personal life. Freed also posted information related to his job, such as highlighting communications from other city officials and soliciting feedback from the public on issues of concern. Freed often responded to comments on his posts, including those left by city residents with inquiries about community matters. He occasionally deleted comments that he considered “derogatory” or “stupid.”
After the COVID–19 pandemic began, Freed posted about it. Some posts were personal, and some contained information related to his job. Facebook user Kevin Lindke commented on some of Freed’s posts, unequivocally expressing his displeasure with the city’s approach to the pandemic. Initially, Freed deleted Lindke’s comments; ultimately, he blocked him from commenting at all. Lindke sued Freed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that Freed had violated his First Amendment rights. As Lindke saw it, he had the right to comment on Freed’s Facebook page because it was a public forum. The District Court determined that because Freed managed his Facebook page in his private capacity, and because only state action can give rise to liability under § 1983, Lindke’s claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affrmed.
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Issue: Whether a public official’s social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.
…
The ambiguity surrounding Freed’s page requires a fact-specifc undertaking in which posts’ content and function are the most important considerations. A post that expressly invokes state authority to make an announcement not available elsewhere is official, while a post that merely repeats or shares otherwise available information is more likely personal. Lest any official lose the right to speak about public affairs in his personal capacity, the plaintiff must show that the official purports to exercise state authority in specific posts. The nature of the social media technology matters to this analysis. For example, because Facebook’s blocking tool operates on a page-wide basis, a court would have to consider whether Freed had engaged in state action with respect to any post on which Lindke wished to comment.
Date: March 15, 2024
Author: Per Curiam
Split: N/A
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Ninth Circuit
Basic Facts:
Petitioners Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T. J. Zane created public social media pages to promote their campaigns for election to the Poway Unified School District (PUSD) Board of Trustees. After they won, the Trustees noted their official positions on their pages, and used their pages to post PUSD-related content and to solicit feedback and communicate with constituents. Respondents Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, who have children attending PUSD schools, began posting lengthy and repetitive comments on the Trustees’ public pages. The Trustees initially deleted the Garniers’ comments before blocking them from commenting altogether. The Garniers sued the Trustees pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights. As relevant here, the District Court allowed the case to proceed because the Trustees acted “under color of” state law for purposes of § 1983 when they blocked the Garniers. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that § 1983’s state-action requirement was satisfied because the official “appearance and content” of the Trustees’ pages established a “close nexus between the Trustees’ use of their social media pages and their official positions.”
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Issue: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social-media account when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
Because the Ninth Circuit’s approach to § 1983’s state-action requirement differs from the one the Court elaborates today in Lindke v. Freed, 601 U. S. 187, the judgment below is vacated and the case remanded.
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Date: March 19, 2024
Author: Sotomayor
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Roberts, Alito, Thomas
Appeal From: Third Circuit
Basic Facts:
Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the removal of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discretion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enumerated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D).
Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United States beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for cancellation of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old, U. S.-born son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support. To meet the hardship standard, Wilkinson had to show that M. “would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.” In re MonrealAguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62. Considering all of the hardship factors presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.’s situation did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship and denied Wilkinson’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit held that it lacked the jurisdiction necessary to review the IJ’s discretionary hardship determination. This Court granted certiorari to determine
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Issue: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.
Holding: Reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
The Immigration Judge’s discretionary decision that Situ Kamu Wilkinson failed to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(D)’s jurisdiction restoring exception for “questions of law”; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit’s holding that the IJ’s decision was unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was in error.
Date: March 19, 2024
Author: Gorsuch
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Ninth Circuit
Basic Facts:
Respondent Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, brought suit alleging that the government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. In his complaint, Mr. Fikre alleged that he traveled from his home in Portland, Oregon to Sudan in 2009 to pursue business opportunities there. At a visit to the U. S. embassy, two FBI agents informed Mr. Fikre that he could not return to the United States because the government had placed him on the No Fly List. The agents questioned him extensively about the Portland mosque he attended, and they offered to take steps to remove him from the No Fly List if he agreed to become an FBI informant and to report on other members of his religious community. Mr. Fikre refused. He then traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where he alleges authorities interrogated and detained him for 106 days at the behest of the FBI. Unable to fly back to the United States, he ended up in Sweden, where he remained until February 2015. While there, he filed this suit, alleging that the government had violated his rights to procedural due process by failing to provide either meaningful notice of his addition to the No Fly List or any appropriate way to secure redress. He further alleged that the government had placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons related to his race, national origin, and religious beliefs. Mr. Fikre sought, among other things, an injunction prohibiting the government from keeping him on the No Fly List and a declaratory judgment confirming the government had violated his rights. In May 2016, the government notified Mr. Fikre that he had been removed from the No Fly List and sought dismissal of his suit in district court, arguing that its administrative action had rendered the case moot. The district court agreed with the government, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a party seeking to moot a case based on its own voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must show that the conduct cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” 904 F. 3d 1033, 1039. On remand, the government submitted a declaration asserting that, based on the currently available information, Mr. Fikre would not be placed on the No Fly List in the future, and the district court again dismissed Mr. Fikre’s claim as moot. The Ninth Circuit once again reversed, holding that the government had failed to meet its burden because the declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Mr. Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. 35 F. 4th 762, 770–772.
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Issue: Whether Fikre’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.
Holding: Affirmed.
The government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Yonas Fikre’s removal from the government’s No Fly List mooted his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.
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